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"(The concept informal sector) is invoked to refer to street vendors in Bogota, shoe-
shine workers in Calcutta, specialized knitwear in Modena and producers of fashion 
garments in New York City (...) These activities are lso likely to be unregulated by 
the state and excluded from standard economic accounts f national accounts" 
 Swaminathan, M. "Understanding the Informal Sector: A Survey", M.I.T. 
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Determinants and Performance of theFormal Sector 




This paper analyses what the determinants of firm for ality are and the impact of that 
formality on firm productivity and paid wages. Using a matched firm-entrepreneur 
dataset for two North African countries, we conclude that firm size and age as well as 
the age and education of the entrepreneur have a significant and positive impact on the 
likelihood of firm formality. In opposite direction, firms with a seasonal activity or with 
a single plant are more likely to be informal. We also provide empirical evidence 
supporting the view that, ceteris paribus, formal firms have a better performance. We 
use the OLS estimate to show that formal firms have a higher productivity in Egypt and 
in Morocco, 10% and 34% respectively. These results are robust to instrument possible 
endogenous variables, such as the firm registration and the number of workers. Lastly, 
the evidence dealt with is not conclusive enough to support the idea that formal firms 
pay a premium to their workers in comparison to the wages paid by their counterparts in 




Este paper analisa quais são os determinantes de formalidade entr  empresas, bem 
como o impacto da formalidade na produtividade e salários pagos pela empresa. Usando 
uma base de dados empresa-empreendedor para dois paíse  Norte-Africanos concluímos 
que o tamanho e a idade da empresa, bem como a idade e o nível de escolaridade do 
empreendedor têm um impacto positivo significante na probabilidade da empresa ser 
formal. Em sentido oposto, empresas cuja actividade é apenas sazonal, ou que possuem 
apenas uma fábrica, são mais prováveis de serem informais. Encontramos, ainda, 
evidência empírica que suporta a teoria de que as empresas formais, ceteris paribus, têm 
uma melhor performance. Estimamos por OLS que as empresas formais têm uma 
produtividade maior no Egipto e em Marrocos: 10% e 34%, respectivamente. Estes 
resultados são robustos à instrumentalização das variáveis potencialmente endógenas, 
tais como o registo das empresas e o número de trabalhadores. Por fim, não 
encontramos evidência estrita ou contundente que suporte a ideia de que as empresas 
formais paguem, ceteris paribus, salários superiores às empresas do sector informal. 
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Within this paper we analyze the profile and performance of Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs) in Egypt and Morocco. The study of this topic is particularly important and relevant 
since a large share of the working population of developing countries is employed in these small 
size firms. Therefore, the SMEs play a very important role in the overall economy and in its 
functioning.  
Tightly connected with the SMEs is the informality ssue, which is the main focus of our 
study1. Throughout this paper we will try to pinpoint the main determinants of the formalization 
and economic success of firms, contributing simultaneously to better understand and clarify the 
relation between these two concepts. 
Moreover, the analysis of the informal sector2 is very significant and interesting as it is 
positively viewed due to some of its aspects, namely, it employs a large share of workers (in 
Egypt about 55% and in Morocco about 45% of all non-agricultural employment in the period 
1994-2000, according to the ILO (2002)3), and it can play a greater flexibility role in society. 
But it is also true that the informal sector is often associated with some negative stylized facts 
such as the characterization of the sector as a low-paid, low-productivity and low-skilled one, 
which raises several growth and equity concerns. 
Furthermore, according to the World Bank (2010) both Egyptian and Moroccan firms had 
been seeing the informal sector and the illegal competition as major barriers and constrains to 
their development and to the possibility of showing better performances. This fact increases the 
importance of analyzing this sector. 
Geographically, both Egypt and Morocco are part of the Middle East and North Africa 
region (MENA). This region is a vital source of global economic stability and of crucial 
importance to enable worldwide economic growth due to their reserves of natural resources.  
Nowadays the MENA region faces major population and employment challenges since the 
forecast points out to an increasing number of informal firms and workers - the predictable 
population growth is much higher than the best forecasts for formal job creation. Moreover, the 
prevalence of a very young and often low-skilled population tends to worsen this scenario thus 
raising important efficiency concerns.  
                                                           
1 Despite the existence of a broad literature studying the informal sector in developed countries, this paper 
only focus and covers the informality phenomenon in developing ones, as its the case of MENA 
countries. 
2 It is important to highlight that this paper only focus on micro-determinants. There is already a 
considerable amount of literature referring to the macro-determinants of informality, such as the type and 
enforcement of regulation, taxation or legal quality. For a good study on this topic see, for instance, 
Dabla-Norris et al (2005) or Loyaza et al (2009). 
3 Schneider and Enste (2000) also identified a shadow or underground economy accounting for 68% and 
39% of the Egyptian and Moroccan respective GDP. 
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This region also shows some disappointing labor market outcomes, which can be, at least 
partially, explained by poor labor market policies ( .g. poor contract enforcement) and by the 
poor quality of the public services associated with the private sector, which suffers from low 
dynamism and low  private investment.  
Indeed, both Egypt and Morocco experience these generic problems and face these 
challenges. However, it is important to stress thatin Egypt the over-regulation granting too 
much job protection to insiders in the job market and the existence of too much legal 
bureaucracy4 are some of the major challenges and concerns, while in Morocco the concern is 
mostly with the considerable deficit of population education and skills. 
Therefore, getting important insights on the determinants and performance of the SMEs by 
paying special attention to the informal sector may allow to design better policies and to 
establish objectives targeting an improvement in the productivity of the micro-entrepreneurial 
sector and in the workers welfare.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a broad literature 
review on the informal vs formal sector topics. Section 3 describes the survey and data used. 
Section 4 describes the measure of formality we choose to focus on and the empirical 
determinants of formality according to the definition presented. Section 5 presents a model to 
evaluate the impact of firm formality on firm productivity and provides empirical results about 
it. Section 6 provides empirical results about the impact of firm formality on the wages paid by 
the firm. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
The literature on the formal and informal sectors is not as extensive and deep as on other 
economic topics, despite the importance of the topic and of the fact that these issues are being 
on debate for several years. There are, although, some important and remarkable works that 
pinpoint some of the micro determinants of the informal sector as well as its characteristics. In 
Liimatainen (2002) and Dabla-Norris et al. (2005) we find empirical support for the stylized 
characterization of the informal sector as employing low-skilled and low-educated workers, as 
well as being closely linked with firms of small dimension and with poor access to financial 
markets. The authors also highlight that these characte istics, together with the great difficulty 
in providing the development of skills and its adequacy to their workers, contribute to the 
existence of a sector   with low productivity and inovation. 
Amaral and Quintin (2005) suggest a workers self-selection model which not only supports 
these stylized facts, but it also helps to explain why this can happen. They present a model 
where informal managers, whose firms have less access to financial markets, decide to replace 
                                                           
4
 According to the World Bank data, it took 193 days to register a new business in 2004. 
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physical capital by non-skilled labor, assuming that t is type of labor is the best substitute for 
capital. So, informal firms end up with more unskilled and unqualified workers than formal 
firms and are, therefore, less productive. 
In order to empirically identify the determinants of firm informality, Perry et al. (2007) uses 
data from Brazil and Mexico to conclude that informality among firms decreases along with the 
entrepreneurs’ education and has an u-shaped relation with their age ─ first increases and then 
decreases. Moreover, bigger and older firms are less ikely to be informal5 . Paula and 
Scheinkman (2007), using firm tax registration as the definition for formality and a different 
dataset, find the same results for the Brazilian case, which reinforces the validity of these results.  
Also Levenson and Maloney (1998) report that "young a d small firms are disproportionally 
informal" alluding to his conclusion that firms whic  start operations informally tend to grow in 
size and in operations, which leads them to transform  into formal ones.  
Making an international comparison Elbadwi and Loyaza (2008) use small firms pooling 
data from Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon and Turkey and conclude that the likelihood of firm 
formality is higher in Turkey than in any of the other African countries. But the most 
remarkable result is that informal firms are on aver g  less productive than formal ones. 
We can find similar results in other empirical studies. For instance, Perry et al. (2007) use 
pooled data from Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico, Panama and Peru and find that informal firms are 
on average 30% less productive than formal firms, even after controlling for several firm and 
industry-specific characteristics. Taymaz (2009) also finds significant differences in the 
productivity of Turkish formal and informal firms. 
There is another old but always hot and relevant discussion on the possible segmentation or 
not of the sectors, as well as a possible wage gap. It brings back to the discussion of the dual 
market hypothesis ─ a traditional view defended by Fields (1975) or Dickens and Lang (1985), 
which states that workers rationed out of the modern/formal sector, often due to job shortages, 
escape unemployment by entering into the more flexib  informal sector. This is an 
exclusionary view since it assumes that workers would prefer the benefits of formal and regular 
jobs, although they cannot get them, so they have to op  for the second choice of entering the 
disadvantageous informal market. Then, the informal sector just appears as a queuing and 
second-best opportunity, with authors defending the existence of (noneconomic) barriers to 
mobility between sectors, which results in a secondary/informal market characterized by a flat 
and low wage profile. 
                                                           
5 The author uses alternately the firms absence of license, non-payment of taxes or absence of social 
security as the criteria for being informal. However, the results presented are common to all the possible 
definitions of informality. 
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More recently, some authors, as Maloney (1999; 20046) and Loyaza and Rigolini (2006) 
have begun to question this conventional paradigm, offering alternative explanations and 
descriptions for reality. They argue that an important share of informal jobs simply reflects 
inherent differences in job requirements, as well as the workers’ rational and voluntary choices 
depending on their individual preferences and their sk lls endowments. It is also based on a 
personal cost-benefit analysis of entering the formal sector.  This new view also assumes that 
the movements and the openness between sectors are considerably more, as both the economic 
activity and the workers tend to freely shift between the informal and the formal sector, and 
vice-versa.  
Boeri and Garibaldi (2006) and Albretch et al. (2006) present theoretical models with the 
sorting of workers between sectors according to their endowments and skills. Galiani and 
Weinschelbaum (2007) and Dimova et al. (2008) go further in their analysis and empirically 
conclude that there is a self-selection of more educated workers and with more human capital in 
the formal sector7. 
Despite all these arguments and as Perry et al. (2007) highlight "there is no clear a priori 
presumption that informal employment should carry lower, equal or higher earnings than formal 
jobs". On the one hand, informal jobs should command higher earnings to compensate workers 
for the value of lost fringe benefits (such as social protection) and their greater risk of 
unemployment. On the other hand, earnings may be low r to adjust for the value of non 
pecuniary benefits, such as more general flexibility or tax savings. 
Even empirically the results on this supposed wage gap (and its direction) are quite disperse 
and divergent.  Using a matched worker-firm level dataset, specifically working with the 
workers’ individual wages as the dependant variable Fox and Gaal (2008) get, for Uganda, a 
30% lower wage in the case of men working in the informal sector and a 45% lower wage in the 
case of women when comparing with their counterparts in the formal sector. Almeida 
(forthcoming) finds similar results for Mauritania. However, very different results were found 
by Marcouiller et al. (1997) for Mexico, where he documents a wage premium for the workers 
in the informal sector. Bargain and Kwenda (2009) show that the magnitude and even the 
direction of the wage gap between sectors depend on the level of the wage distribution. The 
authors conclude that the positive wage differential between the formal and the informal sector 
tends to decrease as we consider the top of the wag distribution. The gap can even become 
negative turning into an informal sector wage premiu .  
                                                           
6 In Maloney (2004) we find several empirical result that help to support his idea. For instance, 60% of 
Mexican self-employed workers left their previous job to enter voluntarily in the informal sector; while in 
Brazil 62% of self-employed male workers referred that they do not want to move to the formal sector 
because they feel happy with their current informal sector job. 
7 In these models workers are heterogeneous and endog ously decide in which sector they want to work 
according to their preferences. Galiani and Weinschelbaum (2007) focus on Latin American countries, 
while Dimova et al. (2008) focus on West African countries. 
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We have already referred that workers tend to chose whether to enter the formal sector or to 
remain in the informal one. The same choice needs to be done at the firm level, as firms also 
have costs and benefits related to being formal. Perry et al. (2007) summarize very well both the 
advantages and the drawbacks of formality for firms. On the one hand, they can have access to 
formal capital and financing markets as well as to further business information and advisory 
councilling. Moreover, they can protect their property rights and have access to courts in order 
to better enforce any signed contract. On the other hand, they lose some autonomy and 
flexibility, since they need to cope with regulation and bureaucracies. Another drawback has to 
do with the high costs of the registration process, and also with the fact that a formal firm needs 
to comply with fiscal obligations and pay taxes. Following these arguments, McKenzie and 
Sakho (2007) conclude that firms decide to become formal or not according to a rational profit 
maximization choice, where they take into consideration both costs and the benefits of doing so. 
Returning back to the origins of the concept of the informal sector, it was primarily used in a 
report on Kenya prepared by the ILO in the beginnings of 70s8. One of the first well-known 
definitions is from De Soto (1989), who defines it as "the collection of firms, workers and 
activities that operate outside the legal and regulatory frameworks". However, the existence of 
multiple concept definitions, which appeared meanwhile, and in order to create smoothness in 
data collection processes as well as to allow the comparability of results across countries, a new 
standard worldwide definition was established during the Fifteenth International Conference of 
Labor Statisticians (in 1993): the group of household enterprises (or unincorporated enterprises 
owned by households) that includes both the informal-own account enterprises and enterprises 
of informal employers (with a continues base). The firms should also fulfill one or both of the 
criteria: size of unit below a specific level of employment and non-registration of the enterprise 
or its employees9. 
More recently, and according to Hussmanns (2004) researchers updated this 1993 definition 
in order to absorb and reflect the changes and expansion of this sector in developing countries. 
In the new expanded framework the informal sector is described as the sum of the total informal 
employment, which is comprised not only by workers mployed in informal firms, but also by 
wage workers that even working in formal firms do not have social security protection10. 
Hanley et al. (2006) precisely highlight the small attention that literature still gives to the 
conceptual differences of the formal sector used in empirical studies, and refer that those 
differences can result in biased and wrong conclusions when trying to compare different studies. 
                                                           
8 According to the ILO (1972), the study appeared as a response to the increasing growth of large cities 
and mass unemployment in African developing countries. Moreover, the concept was firstly used as a 
means to distinguish formal and informal income opportunities on the basis of whether the activity 
entailed wage or self-employment.  
9 Adapted from ILO Report of the Fifteenth International Conference of Labor Statisticians, Geneva 1993. 
10 Summing up, the major differences are that it goes d eper in counting precarious employment for 
formal firms as well as new types of informality. 
10 
Jütting et al. (2007) also refer the inaccuracy that m y arise from comparing international 
studies on different countries based on unlike definitions, concepts and contexts.  
3. Data 
Our study explores a matched workers-entrepreneur-firm 11  dataset collected by the 
Economic Research Forum as part of its project on “Promoting Competitiveness in Micro and 
Small Enterprises in the MENA region”12 for Egypt (2003) and Morocco (2002).  
This collection of data used a national, stratified and multi-staged systematic sampling 
method to identify firms. Then, a total of 4958 interviews were carried out in Egypt over the 
three major administrative regions13. In Morocco, 5210 interviews were carried out in ni e 
different administrative regions14. All of these interviews were done with firms ranging between 
1 and 50 workers, that is, with SMEs. 
Moreover, as described in Hussmanns (2004) and in order to cope with the regular 
definitions of informality, which are often based on non-agricultural firms, we opted to drop the 
observations for those firms in Egypt. For Morocco, the sample already did not include any 
agricultural firm. 
 A very detailed questionnaire with 322 questions wa  applied in this survey, which contains 
three specific questions about the different types of formality: i) if the firm is registered with the 
industrial or commerce register; ii) if the firm is registered with the tax department (it acquired a 
tax card or card number); and iii) if the firm keeps regular accounts15. 
This is, indeed, a very rich dataset to study the topics of this paper since it contains 
diversified and vast information on workers and firm characteristics.  
At the firm level it contains not only the already specified points on the firms’ registration 
and legal fulfillment, but also information on their geographical location, industry activity 
sector, number of workers per firm, firm’s economic performance during the last year and 
linkages with other firms or associations. 
                                                           
11 The survey asks directly if the entrepreneur of the firm, who answered the survey, is a manager or an 
owner. 
12 These surveys were conducted in four Arabic countries: Egypt, Morocco, Lebanon and Turkey from 
2002 to 2004. They were designed to collect information from the responses of the firm owner or 
manager about his own past and present status and skills, as well as other about the workers’ and firm’s 
characteristics, operations and performance. This dataset was already used by El-Mahdi (2005), Elbadawi 
and Loyaza (2008) and Taymaz (2009) to study similar issues about informality. 
13 The Egyptian regions are: Metropolitan Area, Lower Egypt and Upper Egypt. 
14 The Moroccan regions are: Sous Massa Drâa, Gharb Chrarda Ben Hssen, Marrakech Tensift Al Haouz, 
Oriental, Grand Casablanca, Rabat Salé Zemmour Zaer, Doukkala Abda, Méknès Tafilalet, Fès Boulmène, 
Taza Al Hoceima Taounate and Tanger Tétouan. 
15  The specific questions are: Q84 "Enterprise registered (industrially or commercially)?", Q90 
"Registered with tax department (acquired a tax card or card number)?" and Q98 "Enterprise keeps 
regular accounts?". 
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It also adds to the regular variables about the entrepreneur - such as gender, age, marital 
status, etc - information on his/her experience, tenur  in the present job and educational 
achievements, in terms of formal as well as informal education.  
It still presents data on the composition by gender, skills, training, social security coverage 
and existence or not of written contracts of the firm’s workforce. 
This dataset also has the richness of holding information about similar features for both 
countries, once the questionnaire used was the same, which allows international comparisons 
between the results of different countries. 
Therefore, this dataset is really good both to study and assess the micro and small enterprise 
sector, which is largely composed by informal and uregistered firms, and to identify the impact 
of the firm registration on their performance.  
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the main variables and for all the firms used in the 
paper, both for Egypt and Morocco.  
We can observe that the degree of formality both in Egypt and in Morocco varies 
considerably depending on the considered formality variable (from the three we specified 
before). Indeed, considering the registration criteria we find 75% of formal firms in Egypt and 
49% in Morocco. In terms of tax registration, the formal sector increases to 81% in Egypt and to 
93% in Morocco. Lastly, when taking into consideration the number of SMEs that keep regular 
(financial) accounts, the size of the formal sector decreases substantially to 38% in Egypt and 
14% in Morocco. 
To deeper illustrate these differences we draw Figure 1 and 2 for Egypt and Morocco, 
respectively, where we can observe the pattern of firm ormality according to the different 
criteria and its interaction. 
The main conclusion that directly comes up from the figure is that, indeed, the degree of 
formality is very different depending on which crite ia we consider. For instance, if we consider 
the intersection of the three variables, we just oberve 33% of formal firms in Egypt and 10% in 
Morocco, which is a really small number. However, if we would consider that a formal firm is 
one that respects at least one of the criteria, we get a substantially higher percentage of formal 
firms in both Egypt and Morocco, 85% and 78% respectiv ly. 
This point reinforces the idea expressed by Henley et al. (2006) that the degree of formality 
in an economy can vary substantially depending on the used definition for formality and, 
consequently, someone trying to compare different studies about this topic needs to be very 
careful when inferring conclusions and/or results.  
Therefore, despite the existence of data for using other possible criteria, we decide to 
consider, from now on, a formal firm as the one that is commercially registered, because it is 
one definition widely used in literature (e.g. Perry et al. (2007) or Taymaz (2009)) and in our 
12 
opinion, it is the one that more accurately and more di ectly represents the spirit present in the 
ILO definition of formality from the firm perspective. 
In table 1 we can also observe that the average firm in Egypt employs 2.16 workers and has 
been operating for 12 years, while the average firm in Morocco employs 3.59 workers and is 10 
years old.   
In both countries, the proportion of total firms that are engaged in exporting is really reduced. 
On the other hand, the overwhelming majority of firms has a continuous activity during the year 
and just holds a single plant. 
The major difference in terms of surveyed firms in both countries is related to the proportion 
of firms that can have access to credit. In fact, this value is really low in the Egyptian case, 
where just 5% of the firms had access to credit in the last year (in relation to the survey year), 
while this value is much higher in Morocco ─ 20%. 
In terms of activity the majority of the firms (65% in Egypt and 49% in Morocco) is 
concentrated  in the trading sector. 
Regarding table 2 we can observe that the majority f he entrepreneurs are owners, with just 
38% in Egypt and 29% in Morocco being managers. Moreover, there are considerable more 
men in this leading position, with just 10% and 16% of total entrepreneurs being women in 
Egypt and Morocco, respectively. 
In terms of educational achievements, more than 50% of Egyptian entrepreneurs have a 
secondary or post-secondary degree, with a remaining share of 23% that did not attend any year 
of schooling. In Morocco, the scenario looks worse, with 22% having no schooling at all and a 
higher share of 30% having just primary schooling. Then, less than 50% of total entrepreneurs 
hold secondary or post-secondary degrees16.  
At the workforce level, we can observe that Egyptian workers are more skilled than 
Moroccan ones. This result is in line with our characterization of Morocco as a country falling 
short of more educated and skilled workers.  
Another relevant difference between both countries is related to the share of workers having 
both contract and social security. While these figures are really low for Morocco, with 10% or 
less for both cases, in Egypt these numbers raise for more than 50%, namely 58% of Egyptian 
workers have contracts and 54% of all the workers are also covered by social security. 
Because it is an important and relevant point on the used data, we will make a switchers 
analysis, that is, we will discuss why some firms had decided not to register themselves when 
                                                           
16 These results are aligned with the stated problem of skills deficit in the Moroccan population, which 
helps to validate the dataset. 
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they began operations and what the main motives are that lead some of them to register 
afterwards17.  
First we describe the differences in the main characte istics of firms considering the ones 
that decide not to register in the beginning of their operations, and distinguishing between the 
ones which formalize themselves in the meanwhile and the ones that still remain informal18.  
For both countries, the firms that decide to registr in the meanwhile are both bigger and 
older. The entrepreneurs of these firms are also, on average, more educated.  
On the other hand, a result that we only observe in the Moroccan case is that firms which 
registered have more access to credit than the ones which remained unregistered. This outcome 
is in line with the literature about the advantages of firm formality, namely the better access to 
credit and financial markets. 
After having illustrated the differences between firms that decided not to register in the 
beginning of their operations focusing on their behavior afterwards, i.e.,  switchers into formal 
and non-switchers, we will pinpoint what the motives to their initial non-registration behavior 
were and what the reasons that led some to switch afterw rds were. 
Both in Egypt and in Morocco the majority of firms appointed the uselessness of the status 
itself as the main reason not to register in the beginning.   
However, switcher firms in both countries had different motives to do it. Indeed, while in 
Egypt an overwhelming majority (about 75% of all the switcher firms) did it only because it 
became mandatory, in Morocco this value is not only much smaller, but also more than half of 
the switcher firms decided to register because they felt it would bring them some advantages. 
The results for Morocco support the existing literau e not only in terms of the rational 
behavior of firms, which decide to formalize or not according to the maximization of their cost-
benefit analysis, but they also seem to sustain Perry et al.’s (2007) arguments that as firms 
survive in time they potentially grow and feel the increasing need of becoming formal while 
they gradually better realize its benefits. 
 4. Determinants of Firm Formality 
We had briefly analyzed the dynamic behavior of the firms between the start of operations 
and the time in which the data was collected. Just by looking at the firms’ behavior at the time 
of the data collection, Tables 3 and 4 present the average differences in the main variables 
between formal and informal firms in Egypt and Morocc , respectively. 
                                                           
17 In this analysis we disregard the Moroccan firms that had formalized themselves when their operations 
began and that, afterwards, decided to continue operating in an unregistered way, since it is not only a 
really small number of firms in this situation, but also because the questionnaire unfortunately does n t 
provide any information on why these firms decided to o it.  
18 In the appendix we present a table with more detailed summary statistics about these differences. 
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In both countries, formal firms employ more people, are older and have more access to 
credit19 . This last point is particularly significant in the case of Morocco. Moreover, 
entrepreneurs of formal firms are on average more trained and more educated than their 
counterparts in informal firms, while there is a higher proportion of women entrepreneurs in the 
informal sector than in the formal one. Lastly, there is a higher proportion of women workers in 
the informal sector than in the formal one, while not surprisingly the workforce in the formal 
sector is on average more protected, that is, there is a higher proportion of workers with contract 
and social security provision when compared with the informal sector. This difference is really 
substantial in the Egyptian case, where 66% of workers in the formal sector are covered by 
social security, while only 17% of workers in the informal sector benefit from the same 
coverage.  
Profit-maximizing firms will decide to formalize ifthe expected present value of the benefits 
of doing  it is higher than its costs, that is, the net value ( ) must be positive.  
  Equation (1) 
However, since  is unobservable, Equation (1) cannot be estimated dir ctly. So, we assume 
that , the net value for firm j is a linear function of several observable characteristics: 
 , where  is a vector of entrepreneur characteristics,  is a vector of 
firm characteristics and  is the unobservable error term20. 
Therefore, and following our model specification, the probability of firm j to be formal is 
given by: 
  Equation (2) 
Assuming that the residuals ,, are normally distributed, we can estimate Equation (2) by 
maximum likelihood (probit). Tables 5 and 6 report the marginal effect at mean values of the 
values of interest for different specifications of Equation (2) in Egypt and Morocco, 
respectively21. 
                                                           
19 As in our discussion about the switchers, the results seem to support the theoretical literature on the 
advantages of formalization as well as the fact that older firms tend to formalize more. 
20 J is the firm subscript. 
21 In the spirit of Henley (2006), which presents econometric analysis revealing that the conditional 
impact of different demographic and educational factors on the likelihood of firm formality can vary 
considerably depending on the considered definition, we decide to do a robustness analysis in the 
appendix. We consider, then, two alternative definitio s for a formal firm: to be tax registered or keep 
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Our preferred specification for both countries is number (4) where we control for firm effects 
as well as for the entrepreneur characteristics22. 
Our findings for Egypt and Morocco suggest that formality likelihood increases with the firm 
size. In fact, all coefficients for dummy variables correspondent to different sizes of firms are 
significant and positive in relation to single-worke  firms, which means that firms of self-
employed workers tend to be more informal than all other multi-worker firms. This result is the 
expected one since informality is extensively associated in literature with small-sized firms. 
Also, both the age of the firm and its access to credit have a positive impact on the firm 
formality. This last result looks, again, consistent with the argument of favorable access to 
financial markets for formal firms.  
We would like to highlight that in the Moroccan case easonality of firm operations and 
formality appear as strongly negatively correlated, since seasonal firms are 38% less likely to be 
formal than permanent ones. 
Regarding the entrepreneur characteristics, we find some standard and expected results on  
the probability of firm formality. This probability increases with age, it reaches a pick and then 
declines, and it also increases with education and training. For instance, in Egypt an 
entrepreneur with a post-secondary degree has 21% more chances to work in a formal firm than 
an individual with no education. This number raises to 38% in the Moroccan case. On the other 
hand, the positive marginal effect of the dummy for past training is much more modest, being 
5% in Egypt and 3% in Morocco. 
Lastly, firms owned or run by female entrepreneurs are, ceteris paribus, 12% less likely to 
be formal in the Moroccan case, while in Egypt and fter controlling for entrepreneurs levels of 
education we did not find any significant differenc regarding the entrepreneur’s gender.  
5.1 Impact of Formality on Firm Productivity 
One of the main questions regarding the formal and informal sectors is concerned with the 
productivity of the firms in those sectors. As suggested by Silva et al. (2009), it is not possible, 
a priori, to know what the effect of formality is on firm productivity. Indeed, this effect can be 
either positive or negative, since there are theoretically potential effects and arguments 
supporting a higher productivity for both sectors. On the one hand, formalization can lead to the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
regular accounts. Despite these considerations, our analysis show similar qualitative results regardless of 
the considered definition of formality.  
The only remarkable difference is in the coefficient signal of the entrepreneur being a woman. Indeed, 
while not significant, or even with a negative impact on the firm likelihood of formality for the other 
definitions of formality, when we consider a formal firm as the one that keeps regular accounts, a firm 
with a female entrepreneur is more likely to be formal than one run by a male. 
22
 Aside from the results presented, we also tested a model including job tenure and a firm’s foreign 
ownership. However, we disregarded these variables cause their coefficients were always non 
significant. 
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increase of the firm’s customer base, to an easy access to financial markets or even to an access 
improvement of production factors, which may result in a higher productivity for formal firms. 
On the other hand, Almeida and Carneiro (2005) argue that due to the need of compliance with 
labor regulations and legal restrictions, formal firms can lose some flexibility and, therefore, 
become less profitable and productive than the informal ones. 
Therefore, whether formal firms are more or less productive than the informal ones turns into 
an empirical question. 
Before getting into the main question, we present some descriptive statistics for the 
logarithms of productivity, wage and capital variables in table 7. We can observe that capital 
has not only the higher mean value, but it is also the one with the highest standard deviation 
among Egyptian and Moroccan firms. That is, capital is the variable that presents more 
volatility within both countries. On the other hand, comparing both countries we can state that 
Moroccan firms are on average more productive and have more capital. Moroccan workers are 
also, on average, better paid than the Egyptian ones. 
In order to empirically test the impact of formality on productivity, we assume a model 
already used in literature in studies on similar contents. Almeida and Carneiro (2006) and 
Saliola and Seker (2011) consider cobb-douglas production functions of the type:  . 
Therefore, we assume that firm value added (productivity) can be expressed by the following 
log-log function:  
 Equation (5.1) 
Where ln  is the logarithm of productivity for firm j, Registeredj is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 if the firm j is commercially or industrially registered, ln  is the logarithm of the capital 
stock, ln  is the logarithm of the total number of workers employed,  includes a set of 
workforce, firm and entrepreneur characteristics and  captures the firm-specific productivity 
shocks. The main coefficient of interest is  which, all else constant, captures the productivity 
premium of formal firms relative to the informal ones. 
Tables 8 and 9 present the main results of the paper. Each column shows the least square 
estimates of equation (5.1) and the impact of formality on productivity for different sets of 
controlling variables. 
In column (1), where we just control for the firm capital stock and used labor, we can 
observe that formal firms are 19% and 44% more productive than the informal ones in Egypt 
and Morocco, respectively. However, there are other variables of interest (such as the education 
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of the entrepreneur or the skills of the workforce) which are likely to be not only correlated with 
the firm formality, but also have a statistically significant impact on productivity. Therefore, our 
preferred specification is number (6) where we control for several relevant factors apart from 
the capital and labor of the production function. Doing so, we believe that we can get a better 
estimate of the real impact of formality on firm productivity. 
In column (6) the impact of formality on productiviy is weaker, but remains significant and 
positive. The results show that registered firms are on average more productive than 
unregistered ones ─ 10% in Egypt and 34% in Morocco. However, for several reasons, it can 
happen that registeredj is correlated with the error term, which biases the estimate for ρ. For 
instance, the positive correlation between the decision for firm formality and the firm 
productivity is likely to result in an upward biased OLS coefficient for the impact of registration 
on productivity.   
Productivity is also positively correlated with the level of capital in both countries. The 
values for the elasticity of capital (9% in Egypt and 11% in Morocco) are also not too far from 
the 29% found by Saliola and Seker (2011) for a pool of 81 countries worldwide. 
Quite interestingly in Egypt the labor elasticity is not statistically significant different from 
zero regarding almost all specifications but one, which is negative, whereas in Morocco there is 
a significant and positive labor elasticity of 6%. In literature we also find distinct results. For 
instance, Saliola and Seker (2011) find an average l bor elasticity of 21% for the 81 countries 
studied, while Elbadwi and Loyaza (2008) do not find any statistical significant impact of the 
logarithm of the number of workers in the logarithm of the firm productivity. 
The level of education of the entrepreneur is also highly positive correlated with the firm 
productivity. For instance, ceteris paribus, a firm run by an entrepreneur holding a post-
secondary degree is 31% and 18% more productive in Egypt and Morocco, respectively, than a 
firm run by an entrepreneur with no educational degre . This outcome is qualitatively the same 
as presented by Silva et al. (2009) for the Moroccan case. 
5.2 Endogeneity and Robustness 
Equation (5.1) raises some endogeneity concerns. Fir t, in a production function the firm 
tends to decide how much to produce at the same timhat it decides how much of each 
production factors will be used. In our specification we consider that in line with the most used 
macroeconomic models there is no simultaneity problem between productivity and capital once 
we assume that the value of capital to be used in the production function was a decision made in 
a previous period. On the other hand, to face the pot ntial simultaneity of labor we follow the 
approach suggested by Wooldridge (2005) of using lag ed variables to instrument for the 
endogenous ones. Therefore, we will use as an instrument the number of workers employed by 
the firm when it started operations. 
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Secondly, someone could suspect of endogeneity of the registration dummy, because there 
may be some non-observable but existing factors affecting simultaneously the firm decision of 
registration as well as its productivity. Therefore, in order to strengthen our results we decide to 
run 2SLS regressions following the same specification of equation (5.1), but recurring to 
predetermined instruments ─ a dummy variable equals to 1 for firms who started operations as 
registered ones and a variable accounting for the age of the firm. We choose the first variable in 
the same spirit of Wooldridge (2005) and the second e is chosen because it is an important 
determinant of the firm’s formality decision as we observe in section 4, and also because the 
correlation of the age of the firm correlation with the firm productivity is weak. We believe that 
not only are these instruments good because they are highly correlated with the endogenous 
variables and have a small correlation with the dependent variable or the error term, but they 
also make sense and are valid from an economic point of view.  
Instrumental variables estimates are presented in tables 10 and 11 for Egypt and Morocco, 
respectively. In column (1) we only use two instruments, which turns the regression in a just-
identified one. In order to perform a Sargan test and evaluate the goodness of the model and the 
instruments we use in column (2) the age of the firm as an additional instrument. 
As we have already stated we should expect the 2SLS coefficient for registration to be 
smaller than the previous OLS estimate. However, quite surprisingly we get an even higher 
impact of registration on productivity than before23.  
Therefore, we are confident that the OLS estimates r , if not a precise measure, at least a 
good low-boundary for the differences in productivity between sectors. Moreover, our results 
are in line with previous literature for Morocco, where Silva et al. (2009) using data from 2007 
for micro-firms found that in Morocco formal firms are more productive than informal firms 
with values the following values: 21%, using a propensity-matching estimator to avoid 
endogeneity, and 52%, using standard OLS procedures,. 
6.1 Impact of Formality on Firm Paid Wage 
Another hot topic in the literature on the informal and formal sectors relates to the existence 
and the direction of a wage differential between sectors. That is first it is important to 
understand if controlling for several specific workers characteristics, there is a significant 
difference between the average wages paid in the formal and in the informal sectors and, 
assuming that there is this difference, in which sector the workers are better paid. 
                                                           
23 It happens for both 2SLS regressions (with 2 and with 3 instruments) on both countries. Moreover, as 
we can observe the p-value in column (2) allows to accept the model specification as well as the 
instruments used in Egypt. In Morocco, at a 5% level of confidence we reject either the model 
specification or the instruments used. However, the lack of potential instruments in the dataset does not 
allow us to try other specification for Morocco. We are still confident that the results we find are ov rall 
robust. 
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In order to get some insights, Figures 3 and 4 graphic lly represent the wage distributions in 
Egypt and Morocco, respectively. We can observe that in Morocco there is not only a higher 
mean wage value when comparing it with Egypt, but its wage distribution is also more 
concentrated around the mean value and  less volatile across firms. 
As we have seen in section 2, and because there are plausible and acceptable theoretical 
arguments in favor of both possible results, the qustion of whether firm formality has a positive 
or negative impact on paid wages turns into an empirical question. Indeed, if on the one hand 
we can expect higher wages in the formal sector because the informal firms tend to hire mostly 
unskilled or low-skilled workers and, therefore, they do not reward significantly past education 
or training. On the other hand, formal firms need to comply with labor regulations and pay taxes 
on employed labor, which can result in lower net wages for their workers.  
However, our analysis presents some limitations in terms of the dependent variable accuracy. 
Indeed, in the dataset there is no information on the individual wage received by all workers 
within each firm. Therefore we use the total firm wage bill divided by the number of workers in 
the firm as the best and more accurate proxy for the average wage in each firm. We are 
confident that controlling for several workers characteristics we can dilute this limitation and 
get, if not a precise result about its magnitude, th n a good estimate of what the direction of the 
gap is (if it exists) between the average wages paid by registered and non registered firms. 
Then, to evaluate the impact of several observable characteristics on wages, we follow 
Mincer (1974) and consider a reduced form equation of the type: 
  Equation (6.1) 
Where ln  is the logarithm of the average wage bill paid by firm j, Registeredj is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the firm j is commercially or industrially registered, ln  is the logarithm 
of the total number of workers employed,  includes a set of workforce, firm and entrepreneur 
characteristics and  captures the firm-specific labor earning shocks. The main coefficient of 
interest is  that, all else constant, captures the wage premium paid by formal firms relatively to 
informal ones. 
Tables 12 and 13 report the ordinary least square estimates of equation (6.1). In column (1) 
we just control for firm registration and size. Then, from columns (2) to (6) we add different 
controlling variables of interest in order to isolate the effect of registration on the average wage 
paid by the firm. Therefore, column (6) is our preferred specification. 
We find cross country results very interesting but also different. In Egypt we observe a 
negative formal sector premium when controlling only for firm registration and size, but this 
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effect disappears as we control for additional variables and we get a non-significant difference 
in the average wages paid by formal and informal firms. On the other hand, in Morocco we find 
a positive and significant formal sector wage premiu . Indeed, on average formal firms pay 
wages to their workers 24% higher than informal firms. 
For the control variables we find an interesting result, although not so surprising because it is 
in line with the statistically null impact of a higer share of skilled workers in the firm 
productivity. In fact, in Egypt the regressions do not show firms reward their workers’ skills or 
training by paying higher wages. Indeed, both coeffici nts on the share of skilled workers and 
on the share of trained workers are non-significant and, therefore, we do not find any statistical 
evidence to infer that these two main worker characte istics influence the average wage paid by 
Egyptian firms. In Morocco, our findings are in line with the empirical results showing the 
positive effects on wages of education and human capital as documented, for instance, by 
Dimova et al. (2008). 
6.2 Endogeneity and Robustness 
Equation (6.1) raises endogeneity concerns similar to the ones we already discussed in 
section 5.2. Indeed, these results can be biased by a certain “reverse causality” caused by the 
natural sorting of workers between sectors. Despite our believing that some of these effects are 
already mitigated by the use of average wages at the firm level, and not by individual wages, we 
decide to tackle this issue in a similar way to the pr vious section. Therefore, tables 14 and 15 
show 2SLS estimates for equation (6.1) using the same variables as before as instruments ─ the 
size of the firm when it started operations, if it had decided to register or not at that moment, 
and the age of the firm at the time of the survey. 
Although the magnitudes we get for the wage gaps between sectors  are different from the 
ones in the OLS estimates, our results qualitatively support the same conclusions as before. 
Indeed, while in Egypt we do not find any evidence of wage differentials between the formal 
and the informal sector, in Morocco we get even more confident about the fact that formal firms 
pay on average a premium to their workers when comparing with informal firms24.  
In our opinion, and supported by an increasing stream of literature advocating the idea that 
workers tend to freely choose the sector according to their skills and preferences, the net wages 
paid by similar firms, differing only on being formal or informal, should tend to equalize. In this 
sense, we are not surprised with the empirical result we find in Egypt. This result turns even less 
strange if we simple look at the average wage paid by formal firms which is inferior to the one 
paid by informal firms. On the other hand, this observation does not fit the Moroccan case, 
                                                           
24 It is important to highlight that, for both countries, the specification with three instruments presented in  
column (2) of tables 14 and 15 passes the Sargan test for validity of the instruments and for model 
specification. 
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where on average formal firms pay more. One possible explanation for this wage premium paid 
by formal firms in Morocco is, as already pointed out in sections 1 and 3, the short-fall of more 
educated and skilled workers and entrepreneurs. Then, formal firms, which are often bigger and 
need more qualified workers, decide to pay an extra premium to their workers in order to be 
able to attract the more qualified and skilled ones.  
7. Conclusion 
In this paper we intended to focus on three main topics of the discussion on the formal vs 
informal sectors. First, we study what the main determinants of the firm decision of being or not 
formal are. Secondly, we analyze what the impact of firm formality is on its productivity. And, 
thirdly, we investigate if formal firms tend to pay significantly more than informal firms.  
Using a matched firm-entrepreneur data we find strong evidence supporting the theory that 
formal firms are more productive than the informal ones. We estimate by OLS that formal firms 
are 10% and 34% more productive in Egypt and Morocco, respectively. Moreover, these results 
are robust to several specifications and to possible endogeneity concerns of firm registration and 
number of workers.  
On the other hand, we do not find clear evidence to support the idea that formal firms pay, 
ceteris paribus, more to their workers. Indeed, we find mixed evidnce in this field. While in 
Egypt, after controlling for several firm, entrepreneur and workers characteristics, we find no 
statistical difference in the wages paid by formal and informal firms, in Morocco formal firms 
appear to pay indeed more. However, it is important o refer that, due to the lack of individual 
data about all wages of all the workers, our specificat on to evaluate this issue is quite limited 
because it only considers the average wage paid by each firm, instead of the wage received by 
each worker in the firm, which is the standard and more used approach to this type of analysis. 
Therefore, we should look carefully and with some reservations to these results, but we are 
confident that our analysis is a good approximation t  what actually happens within the 
Egyptian and Moroccan firms regarding the formal and informal sector and the workers in those 
countries. 
Our results show clearly that formal firms tend to be more productive than informal firms. 
But in this study we do not consider any potential benefit or advantage of informal firms that are 
not captured by the financial statements. Policymakers, which tackle the informal sector issue, 
should act carefully and evaluate each country’s specific case in order to decide what kind of 
policies to follow and what kind of goals to pursue, e.g. more restrictive in order to reduce the 
informal sector size or milder. Therefore, they should try to broadly specify and quantify not 
only the disadvantages of the informal sector, e.g. being less productive, but also its advantages, 
e.g. the number of firms or workers that are only i the market due to the greater flexibility they 
can have in the informal sector. 
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Figure 3. Distribution Function of the Egyptian Firm Ln Wage 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics of the Main Firm Level Variables  Table 2. Summary Statistics of the Main Entrepreneur and Workforce Level Variables  
Variable Egypt Morocco Variable Egypt Morocco 
Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean 
Registered 4,944 0.75 5,206 0.49       Entrepreneur Characteristics 
Tax Registered 4,943 0.81 5,197 0.93 Manager 4,939 0.38 5,209 0.29 
Regular Accounting 4,926 0.38 5,191 0.14 Woman 4,944 0.10 5,210 0.16 
Size Age  4,942 40 5,208 38 
  Number of Workers 4,944 2.16 5,210 3.59 Education Level 
  Single Worker 4,944 0.38 5,210 0.24   No Education 4,942 0.23 5,096 0.22 
  Micro (2-4) 4,944 0.57 5,210 0.62   Primary Education 4,942 0.16 5,096 0.30 
  Very Small (5-10) 4,944 0.04 5,210 0.08   Secondary Education 4,942 0.42 5,096 0.37 
  Small (10-49) 4,944 0.01 5,210 0.06   Post-secondary Education 4,942 0.19 5,096 0.11 
Age of Firm 4,895 12 5,205 10 Technical Training 4,944 0.31 5,210 0.66 
Exporter 4,933 0.002 5,181 0.018   Of which Informal Training 1,554 0.95 3,450 0.90 
Seasonal Activity 4,935 0.02 5,193 0.02 Entrepreneur Sole Activity 4,938 0.93 5,168 0.95 
Single Plant 4,937 0.96 5,210 0.98       Workforce Characteristics 
Access to Credit 4,944 0.05 5,181 0.20 Share with Social Security 4,943 0.54 5,205 0.10 
Sector of Activity Share with Contract 4,943 0.58 5,193 0.08 
  Manufacturing 4,944 0.15 5,210 0.24 Share of Women 4,943 0.12 5,036 0.18 
  Trade 4,944 0.65 5,210 0.49 Share of Skilled Workers 4,943 0.90 5,109 0.70 
  Other Services 4,944 0.06 5,210 0.12 Share of Semi-skilled Workers 4,943 0.07 5,109 0.18 
Geographical Region Share of Unskilled Workers 4,943 0.01 5,109 0.07 
  Metropolitan Area 4,944 0.48 - - Share of Apprentices  4,943 0.02 5,109 0.05 
  Lower Egypt 4,944 0.18 - - Share of Trained Workers 4,943 0.06 5,201 0.56 
  Upper Egypt 4,944 0.34 - - Share of Workers related Entrepreneur 4,943 0.76 5,191 0.60 
  Grand Casablanca - - 5,210 0.23 Source: Author's calculations based on MSE Surveys (Economic Research Forum).  
  Rabat-Salé-Zemmour-Zaer - - 5,210 0.16 
  Marrakech-Tensift-El Haouz - - 5,210 0.08 
Source: Author's calculations based on MSE Surveys (Economic Research Forum).  
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Table 3. Differences in Summary Statistics between Formal and Informal Firms in Egypt 
Variable Registered Not Registered 
Obs. Mean Obs. Mean 
Firm Characteristics 
Size 
  Number of Workers 3,684 2.31 1,260 1.72 
  Single Worker 3,684 0.327 1,260 0.522 
  Micro (2-4) 3,684 0.615 1,260 0.457 
  Very Small (5-10) 3,684 0.048 1,260 0.019 
  Small (10-49) 3,684 0.010 1,260 0.002 
Age of Firm 3,649 13 1,246 7 
Exporter 3,677 0.003 1,256 0.0008 
Seasonal Activity 3,677 0.02 1,258 0.04 
Single Plant 3,679 0.95 1,258 0.98 
Access to Credit 3,684 0.05 1,260 0.04 
Entrepreneur Characteristics 
Manager 3,681 0.36 1,258 0.26 
Woman 3,684 0.09 1,260 0.15 
Age  3,683 41 1,259 40 
Education Level 
  No Education 3,683 0.19 1,259 0.33 
  Primary Education 3,683 0.15 1,259 0.19 
  Secondary Education 3,683 0.44 1,259 0.37 
  Post-secondary Education 3,683 0.22 1,259 0.11 
Technical Training 3,684 0.33 1,260 0.27 
  Of which Informal Training 1,214 0.94 340 0.98 
Entrepreneur Sole Activity 3,678 0.93 1,260 0.91 
Workforce Characteristics 
Share with Social Security 3,683 0.66 1,260 0.17 
Share with Contract 3,683 0.59 1,260 0.54 
Share of Women 3,683 0.11 1,260 0.16 
Share of Skilled Workers 3,683 0.89 1,260 0.92 
Share of Semi-skilled Workers 3,683 0.08 1,260 0.05 
Share of Unskilled Workers 3,683 0.02 1,260 0.01 
Share of Apprentices  3,683 0.02 1,260 0.02 
Share of Trained Workers 3,683 0.06 1,260 0.05 
Share of Workers related Entrepreneur 3,683 0.74 1,260 0.83 
Source: Author's calculations based on MSE Surveys (Economic Research Forum).  
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Table 4. Differences in Summary Statistics between Formal and Informal Firms in 
Morocco 
Variable Registered Not Registered 
Obs. Mean Obs. Mean 
Firm Characteristics 
Size 
  Number of Workers 2,532 5.18 2,674 2.08 
  Single Worker 2,532 0.112 2,674 0.365 
  Micro (2-4) 2,532 0.658 2,674 0.593 
  Very Small (5-10) 2,532 0.120 2,674 0.039 
  Small (10-49) 2,532 0.110 2,674 0.003 
Age of Firm 2,531 11.47 2,671 8.45 
Exporter 2,516 0.03 2,662 0.02 
Seasonal Activity 2,522 0.004 2,667 0.03 
Single Plant 2,532 0.97 2,674 0.99 
Access to Credit 2,520 0.27 2,658 0.14 
Entrepreneur Characteristics 
Manager 2,531 0.38 2,674 0.20 
Woman 2,532 0.12 2,674 0.20 
Age  2,530 39.17 2,674 37.04 
Education Level 
  No Education 2,488 0.15 2,604 0.28 
  Primary Education 2,488 0.26 2,604 0.34 
  Secondary Education 2,488 0.42 2,604 0.33 
  Post-secondary Education 2,488 0.18 2,604 0.05 
Technical Training 2,532 0.67 2,674 0.65 
  Of which Informal Training 1,696 0.89 1,750 0.91 
Entrepreneur Sole Activity 2,515 0.95 2,649 0.96 
Workforce Characteristics 
Share with Social Security 2,531 0.18 2,670 0.03 
Share with Contract 2,532 0.12 2,667 0.04 
Share of Women 2,474 0.17 2,558 0.19 
Share of Skilled Workers 2,509 0.68 2,603 0.71 
Share of Semi-skilled Workers 2,509 0.21 2,603 0.16 
Share of Unskilled Workers 2,509 0.07 2,603 0.06 
Share of Apprentices  2,509 0.04 2,603 0.07 
Share of Trained Workers 2,529 0.58 2,668 0.54 
Share of Workers related Entrepreneur 2,530 0.54 2,657 0.66 
Source: Author's calculations based on MSE Surveys (Economic Research Forum).  
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Table 5. Determinants of Firm Formality in Egypt 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Micro [2-4] 0.145*** 0.178*** 0.157*** 0.127*** 
[0.013] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] 
Very Small [5-9] 0.159*** 0.183*** 0.172*** 0.140*** 
[0.019] [0.014] [0.016] [0.020] 
Small [10-49] 0.207*** 0.210*** 0.204*** 0.184*** 
[0.021] [0.010] [0.012] [0.019] 
Age of Firm 0.0233*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] 
Seasonal Activity -0.090** -0.098** -0.090** -0.113** 
[0.045] [0.046] [0.045] [0.046] 
Single Plant -0.103*** -0.099*** -0.091*** -0.074** 
[0.029] [0.028] [0.029] [0.030] 
Access to Credit 0.079*** 0.053** 0.058** 0.045* 
[0.023] [0.025] [0.024] [0.025] 
Manager 0.053*** 0.048*** 
[0.015] [0.015] 
Woman -0.087*** -0.028 
[0.022] [0.020] 
Age 0.008*** 0.009*** 
[0.003] [0.003] 
Entrepreneur Sole Activity 0.083*** 0.119*** 
[0.028] [0.030] 
Primary Education 0.045*** 
[0.017] 
Secondary Education 0.164*** 
[0.015] 
Post-secondary Education 0.208*** 
[0.012] 
Technical Training 0.051*** 
[0.014] 
Industry Fixed Effects Included? No Yes  Yes  Yes  
Region Fixed Effects Included?  No Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 4,880 4,876 4,865 4,863 
Source: Author's calculations based on MSE Surveys (Economic Research Forum).  
Dependent variable is a dummy variable that assumes the value 1 if the firm is commercially or industrially 
registered. Table reports  the marginal effect on the firm's propensity to be registered from probit 
regressions. Robust standard errors  are in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** 
significant at 1%. All variables are defined in Table A1. Single Worker and No Education are the omitted 
size and entrepreneur's education groups, respectively. Age of Firm squared and Age squared are also 




Table 6. Determinants of Firm Formality in Morocco       
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Micro (2-4) 0.289*** 0.283*** 0.252*** 0.227*** 
[0.017] [0.017] [0.019] [0.019] 
Very Small (5-9) 0.429*** 0.449*** 0.421*** 0.382** 
[0.017] [0.017] [0.019] [0.022] 
Small (10-49) 0.549*** 0.557*** 0.550*** 0.528*** 
[0.009] [0.008] [0.009] [0.012] 
Age of Firm 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Seasonal Activity -0.413*** -0.412*** -0.401*** -0.381*** 
[0.039] [0.045] [0.049] [0.058] 
Single Plant -0.189*** -0.154** -0.164*** -0.180*** 
[0.057] [0.060] [0.060] [0.059] 
Access to Credit 0.143*** 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.109*** 
[0.019] [0.019] [0.0120] [0.020] 
Manager 0.113*** 0.117*** 
[0.019] [0.020] 
Woman -0.084*** -0.112*** 
[0.023] [0.023] 
Age 0.019*** 0.022*** 
[0.004] [0.004] 
Entrepreneur Sole Activity 0.026 0.011 
[0.036] [0.037] 
Primary Education 0.108*** 
[0.023] 
Secondary Education 0.287*** 
[0.022] 
Post-secondary Education 0.383*** 
[0.024] 
Technical Training 0.031* 
[0.019] 
Industry Fixed Effects Included? No Yes  Yes  Yes  
Region Fixed Effects Included?  No Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 5,157 5,152 5,111 4,999 
Source: Author's calculations based on MSE Surveys (Economic Research Forum).  
Dependent variable is a dummy variable that assumes the value 1 if the firm is commercially or industrially 
registered. Table reports  the marginal effect on the firm's propensity to be registered from probit 
regressions. Robust standard errors  are in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** 
significant at 1%. All variables are defined in Table A1. Single Worker and No Education are the omitted 
size and entrepreneur's education groups, respectively. Age of Firm squared and Age squared are also 
included in the regressions (not reported). Industry fixed effects refer to the 2-digit industry or service. 
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Table 7. Summary Statistics of the Main Performance Variables 
Egypt 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ln Productivity 4,074 3.89 1.11 - 0.67 10.84 
Ln Wage 4,228 3.15 0.95 - 1.59 7.12 
Ln Capital 4,761 5.00 1.64 - 1.08 13.34 
Morocco 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ln Productivity 5,152 5.33 0.99 0.44 9.52 
Ln Wage 5,210 4.09 0.92 0.12 7.41 
Ln Capital 4,354 6.63 1.74 -2.37 13.78 
Source: Author's calculations based on MSE Surveys (Economic Research Forum).  
Note: The logarithmic values are based in absolute variables quoted in USD at 
current prices at the time of the Survey (1USD/5.89Egyptian Pounds and 
1USD/10.6466 Moroccan Dirhams). 
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Table 8. The Impact of Formality in the Egyptian Firm Productivity (OLS) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Method: OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Registered 0.188*** 0.265*** 0.251*** 0.127*** 0.130*** 0.097** 
[0.038] [0.040] [0.040] [0.049] [0.048] [0.048] 
Ln Capital 0.111*** 0.109*** 0.106*** 0.104*** 0.101*** 0.093*** 
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] 
Ln Number of Workers -0.050 -0.050 -0.059 0.016 -0.036 -0.090* 
[0.039] [0.040] [0.046] [0.053] [0.051] [0.050] 
Share of Woman  -0.210*** -0.180*** -0.187***  -0.143** 
[0.063] [0.064] [0.063] [0.063] 
Share of Skilled Workers 0.246 0.228 0.245 0.186 
[0.217] [0.216] [0.224] [0.220] 
Share of Semi-skilled Workers 0.448** 0.463** 0.491** 0.418* 
[0.225] [0.225] [0.233] [0.228] 
Share of Apprentices 0.0800 0.131 0.160 0.177 
[0.293] [0.293] [0.299] [0.294] 
Share of Trained Workers 0.268*** 0.230** 0.195** 0.112 
[0.091] [0.091] [0.089] [0.091] 
Share with Social Security 0.208*** 0.176*** 0.175*** 
[0.054] [0.054] [0.054] 
Share with Contract 0.144** 0.138** 0.146*** 
[0.056] [0.055] [0.055] 
Exporter 0.673** 0.591** 
[0.278] [0.278] 
Seasonal Activity -0.445*** -0.476*** 
[0.120] [0.118] 
Single Plant -0.697*** -0.671*** 
[0.129] [0.128] 
Access to Credit 0.166** 0.153* 
[0.081] [0.080] 
Primary Education -0.007 
[0.053] 
Secondary Education 0.133*** 
[0.041] 
Post-secondary Education 0.305*** 
[0.057] 
Technical Training 0.128*** 
[0.041] 
Industry Fixed Effects Included? No Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Region Fixed Effects Included?  No Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 3,916 3,916 3,916 3,916 3,900 3,898 
R Squared 0.03 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.12 
Source: Author's calculations based on MSE Surveys (Economic Research Forum).  
The coefficients reported are the least square regression of the ln Productivity on different explanatory variables at 
the firm level. Robust standard errors  are in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 
1%. All variables are defined in Table A1. Share of Unskilled Workers and No Education are the omitted 
schooling variables for the workforce and the entrepreneur, respectively. Industry fixed effects refer to the 2-digit 
industry or service. 
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Table 9. The Impact of Formality in the Moroccan Firm Productivity (OLS) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Method: OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Registered 0.436*** 0.377*** 0.378*** 0.363*** 0.353*** 0.343*** 
[0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] 
Ln Capital 0.144*** 0.133*** 0.128*** 0.115*** 0.110*** 0.107*** 
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] 
Ln Number of Workers 0.158*** 0.181*** 0.188*** 0.15*** 0.075*** 0.056** 
[0.021] [0.022] [0.023] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] 
Share of Woman  -0.016 -0.023 -0.019 -0.021 
[0.046] [0.046] [0.046] [0.046] 
Share of Skilled Workers 0.072 0.060 0.054 0.054 
[0.066] [0.067] [0.067] [0.068] 
Share of Semi-skilled Workers 0.051 0.043 0.055 0.066 
[0.073] [0.073] [0.073] [0.074] 
Share of Apprentices -0.236** -0.195** -0.195** -0.191** 
[0.093] [0.093] [0.093] [0.094] 
Share of Trained Workers 0.066* 0.049 0.047 0.055 
[0.036] [0.036] [0.036] [0.037] 
Share with Social Security 0.458*** 0.411*** 0.409*** 
[0.068] [0.068] [0.068] 
Share with Contract 0.172** 0.171** 0.144** 
[0.067] [0.067] [0.067] 
Exporter 0.465*** 0.437*** 
[0.115] [0.115] 
Seasonal Activity -0.287** -0.322*** 
[0.120] [0.124] 
Single Plant -0.084 -0.097 
[0.110] [0.113] 
Access to Credit 0.157*** 0.153*** 
[0.032] [0.032] 
Primary Education 0.014 
[0.036] 
Secondary Education 0.083** 
[0.037] 
Post-secondary Education 0.176*** 
[0.054] 
Technical Training 0.008 
[0.032] 
Industry Fixed Effects Included? No Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Region Fixed Effects Included?  No Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 4,304 4,304 4,083 4,070 4,023 3,945 
R Squared 0.21 0.30 0.30 0.32 0.33 0.33 
Source: Author's calculations based on MSE Surveys (Economic Research Forum).  
The coefficients reported are the least square regression of the ln Productivity on different explanatory variables at 
the firm level. Robust standard errors  are in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 
1%. All variables are defined in Table A1. Share of Unskilled Workers and No Education are the omitted 
schooling variables for the workforce and the entrepreneur, respectively. Industry fixed effects refer to the 2-digit 
industry or service. 
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Table 10. The Impact of Formality in the Egyptian Firm Productivity (2SLS) 
  (1) (2) 
Method: 2SLS 2SLS 
Registered 0.126** 0.124** 
[0.054] [0.054] 
Instruments  
Registered at Start up, Ln 
Workers at Start up 
Registered at Start up, Age 
of Firm,             
  Ln Workers at Start up 
Workforce, Firm and 
Entrepreneur Characteristics 
Included? 
Yes  Yes  
Industry Fixed Effects Included? Yes  Yes  
Region Fixed Effects Included?  Yes  Yes  
p value of Sargan's test - 0.24 
Observations 3,896 3,859 
R Squared 0.12 0.12 
Source: Author's calculations based on MSE Surveys (Economic Research Forum).  
The table reports the instrumental variables estimates of equation (3) in the text. All regressors of 
column (6) of table 6 are included in columns (2) and (4), but coefficients not reported. Robust 
standard errors  are in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. All 
variables are defined in Table A1. Industry fixed effects refer to the 2-digit industry or service. The 




Table 11. The Impact of Formality in the Moroccan Firm Productivity (2SLS) 
  (1) (2) 
Method: 2SLS 2SLS 
Registered 0.367*** 0.381*** 
[0.039] [0.039] 
Instruments  
Registered at Start up, Ln 
Workers at Start up 
Registered at Start up, Age 
of Firm,             
  Ln Workers at Start up 
Workforce, Firm and 
Entrepreneur Characteristics 
Included? 
Yes  Yes  
Industry Fixed Effects Included? Yes  Yes  
Region Fixed Effects Included?  Yes  Yes  
p value of Sargan's test - 0.24 
Observations 3,930 3,929 
R Squared 0.33 0.33 
Source: Author's calculations based on MSE Surveys (Economic Research Forum).  
The table reports the instrumental variables estimates of equation (3) in the text. All regressors of 
column (6) of table 6 are included in columns (2) and (4), but coefficients not reported. Robust 
standard errors  are in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. All 
variables are defined in Table A1. Industry fixed effects refer to the 2-digit industry or service. The 




Table 12. The Impact of Formality in the Egyptian Firm Paid Average Wage (OLS) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Method: OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Registered -0.184*** -0.033 -0.041 -0.016 -0.014 -0.034 
[0.034] [0.033] [0.033] [0.038] [0.038] [0.038] 
Ln Number of Workers 0.337*** 0.208*** 0.197*** 0.195***  0.167*** 0.121*** 
[0.029] [0.030] [0.032] [0.036] [0.035] [0.036] 





[0.055] [0.055] [0.055] [0.055] 
Share of Skilled Workers -0.067 -0.068 -0.049 -0.095 
[0.149] [0.149] [0.148] [0.148] 
Share of Semi-skilled Workers 0.155 0.153 0.177 0.124 
[0.156] [0.156] [0.155] [0.155] 
Share of Apprentices -0.474** -0.477** -0.445** -0.415** 
[0.188] [0.188] [0.186] [0.187] 
Share of Trained Workers 0.099 0.102 0.075 0.029 
[0.078] [0.078] [0.078] [0.079] 
Share with Social Security -0.058 -0.084** -0.093** 
[0.043] [0.043] [0.043] 
Share with Contract 0.034 0.033 0.034 
[0.042] [0.042] [0.042] 
Exporter 0.246 0.205 
[0.210] [0.203] 
Seasonal Activity -0.213** -0.237** 
[0.106] [0.105] 




Access to Credit 0.270*** 0.251*** 
[0.053] [0.052] 
Primary Education -0.0062 
[0.046] 
Secondary Education 0.071* 
[0.038] 
Post-secondary Education 0.251*** 
[0.045] 
Technical Training 0.076** 
[0.030] 
Industry Fixed Effects Included? No Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Region Fixed Effects Included?  No Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 4,228 4,228 4,228 4,228 4,204 4,203 
R Squared 0.04 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.16 
Source: Author's calculations based on MSE Surveys (Economic Research Forum).  
The coefficients reported are the least square regression of the ln Average Wage on different explanatory variables at the 
firm level. Robust standard errors  are in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. All 
variables are defined in Table A1. Share of Unskilled Workers and No Education are the omitted schooling variables for 
the workforce and the entrepreneur, respectively. Industry fixed effects refer to the 2-digit industry or service. 
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Table 13. The Impact of Formality in the Moroccan Firm Paid Average Wage (OLS) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Method: OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Registered 0.317*** 0.316*** 0.300*** 0.271*** 0.261*** 0.241*** 
[0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.027] 
Ln Number of Workers 0.328*** 0.368*** 0.381*** 0.281***  0.253*** 0.242*** 
[0.017] [0.018] [0.019] [0.020] [0.020] [0.023] 
Share of Woman  -0.083** -0.094** -0.088** -0.091** 
[0.038] [0.037] [0.038] [0.038] 
Share of Skilled Workers 0.242*** 0.222*** 0.224*** 0.220*** 
[0.057] [0.057] [0.057] [0.058] 
Share of Semi-skilled Workers 0.182*** 0.169*** 0.176*** 0.187*** 
[0.062] [0.062] [0.062] [0.062] 
Share of Apprentices -0.205** -0.151* -0.160* -0.155* 
[0.082] [0.082] [0.082] [0.083] 
Share of Trained Workers 0.11*** 0.089*** 0.078** 0.085** 
[0.032] [0.032] [0.031] [0.033] 
Share with Social Security 0.556*** 0.534*** 0.519*** 
[0.058] [0.058] [0.058] 
Share with Contract 0.135** 0.137** 0.119* 
[0.064] [0.063] [0.062] 
Exporter 0.187** 0.155* 
[0.088] [0.088] 




Single Plant -0.053 -0.051 
[0.092] [0.093] 
Access to Credit 0.137*** 0.129*** 
[0.029] [0.029] 
Primary Education -0.020 
[0.032] 
Secondary Education 0.082** 
[0.033] 
Post-secondary Education 0.163*** 
[0.047] 
Technical Training -0.004 
[0.028] 
Industry Fixed Effects Included? No Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Region Fixed Effects Included?  No Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 5,206 5,206 4,931 4,916 4,847 4,747 
R Squared 0.14 0.21 0.22 0.25 0.26 0.26 
Source: Author's calculations based on MSE Surveys (Economic Research Forum).  
The coefficients reported are the least square regression of the ln Average Wage on different explanatory variables at the 
firm level. Robust standard errors  are in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. All 
variables are defined in Table A1. Share of Unskilled Workers and No Education are the omitted schooling variables for 
the workforce and the entrepreneur, respectively. Industry fixed effects refer to the 2-digit industry or service. 
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Table 14. The Impact of Formality in the Egyptian Firm Paid Average Wage (2SLS) 
  (1) (2) 
Method: 2SLS 2SLS 
Registered 0.024 0.023 
[0.044] [0.045] 
Instruments  
Registered at Start up, 
Ln Workers at Start up 
Registered at Start up, 
Age of Firm,                       
  Ln Workers at Start up 
Workforce, Firm and Entrepreneur 
Characteristics Included? 
Yes  Yes  
Industry Fixed Effects Included? Yes  Yes  
Region Fixed Effects Included?  Yes  Yes  
p value of Sargan's test - 0.32 
Observations 4,199 4,162 
R Squared 0.15 0.15 
Source: Author's calculations based on MSE Surveys (Economic Research Forum).  
The table reports the instrumental variables estimates of equation (4) in the text. All 
regressors of column (6) of table 6 are included in columns (2) and (4), but coefficients 
not reported. Robust standard errors  are in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant 
at 5%, *** significant at 1%. All variables are defined in Table A1. Industry fixed effects 




Table 15. The Impact of Formality in the Moroccan Firm Paid Average Wage (2SLS) 
  (1) (2) 
Method: 2SLS 2SLS 
Registered 0.279*** 0.276*** 
[0.034] [0.034] 
Instruments  
Registered at Start up, 
Ln Workers at Start up 
Registered at Start up, 
Age of Firm,                       
  Ln Workers at Start up 
Workforce, Firm and Entrepreneur 
Characteristics Included? 
Yes  Yes  
Industry Fixed Effects Included? Yes  Yes  
Region Fixed Effects Included?  Yes  Yes  
p value of Sargan's test - 0.32 
Observations 4,727 4,724 
R Squared 0.26 0.26 
Source: Author's calculations based on MSE Surveys (Economic Research Forum).  
The table reports the instrumental variables estimates of equation (4) in the text. All 
regressors of column (6) of table 6 are included in columns (2) and (4), but coefficients 
not reported. Robust standard errors  are in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant 
at 5%, *** significant at 1%. All variables are defined in Table A1. Industry fixed effects 







Table A1. Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Registered Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is commercially or industrially registered. 
Registered at Start up 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm was commercially or industrially registered 
when started operations. 
Tax Registered 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has a tax number and is registered with the 
national tax department. 
Regular Accounting Dummy variable equal to 1 if thefirm keeps regular (financial) accounts. 
Productivity 
Value added per month: sales - raw materials and purchase of inputs - energy 
consumption divided by the total number of workers (in USD, using the exchange 
rate at the time of the survey). 
Ln Productivity Natural logarithm of monthly productivity. 
Wage  
Firm's monthly wage bill divided by the number of workers, in USD (exchange 
rate at the time of survey). 
Ln Wage  Natural logarithm of monthly average wage. 
Capital  
Value of the sum of buildings, tools and other equipments divided by the total 
number of workers in the firm (in USD, using the exchange rate at the time of the 
survey). 
Ln Capital Natural logarithm of firm's capital. 
Single Worker, Micro, 
Very Small and Small 
Dummy variables equal to 1 if the total number of workers in the firm is 1, 
between 2 and 4, between 5 and 9, or greater than 10, respectively. 
Ln Number of Workers Natural logarithm of firm's number of workers. 
Ln Workers at Start up Natural logarithm of the number of workers of firms when they started operations. 
Age of Firm Year of the survey minus the year when the firm started operating. 
Exporter Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is engaged in exporting. 
Seasonal Activity 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm's period activity is temporary or seasonal 
and not permanent in time. 
Single Plant Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm just has one operating location. 
Access to Credit Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm had access to credit during the last 12 months. 
Sector of Activity 
Two digit industries/sectors: Fishing and Mining; Manufacturing; Electricity; 
Construction; Trade; Hotels; Transports; Financial Services; Real Estate; 
Education; Health; Other Services. 
Geographical Region 
Dummies 
Geographical location for Egyptian firms: Metropolitan Area; Lower Egypt; Upper 
Egypt; and for Moroccan firms: Souss-Massa-Drâa; Gharb-Chrarda-Béni Hssen; 
Marrakech-Tensift-El Haouz; Oriental; Grand Casablanca; Rabat-Salé-Zemmour-
Zaer; Doukkala-Abda; Meknès-Tafilalet; Fès-Boulemane; Taza-Al Hoceima-
Taonate; Tangier-Tétouan. 
Share with Social Security Percentage of the total firm's workerforce that have social security. 
Share with Contract Percentage of the total firm's workerforce that have a written contract. 
Share of Women Percentage of the total firm's workerforce that are women. 
Share of Skilled Workers, 
Share of Semi-skilled 
Workers, Share of 
Unskilled Workers, Share 
of Apprentices 
Percentage of the firm's workforce that are skilled, semi-skilled, unskilled and 
apprentices, respectively. 
 




Table A1. Variable Definitions (cont.) 
Share of Trained Workers 
Percentage of the total firm's workerforce that received training related with 
present activity. 
Share of Workers related 
with Entrepreneur 
Percentage of the total firm's workerforce that arefri nds or family of the 
entrepreneur. 
Manager Dummy variable equal to 1 if the entrepreneur is manager (versus 0 if is owner). 
Woman Dummy variable equal to 1 if the entrepreneur is a woman.  
Age  Age of the entrepreneur. 




Dummy variables equal to 1 if the entrepreneur attended 0 years, 1-6 years, 7-12 
ears and more than 12 years of schooling, respectively. 
Technical Training  
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the entrepreneur had received formal or informal 
training, in the past, related with present activity. 
Entrepreneur Sole 
Activity 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the entrepreneur has only ne economic activity. 





Table A2. Determinants of Firm Formality in 
Egypt (for Different Definitions) 
Table A3. Determinants of Firm Formality in 










Micro [2-4] 0.110*** 0.169*** 
 





Very Small [5-9] 0.104*** 0.357*** 
 





Small [10-49] 0.126*** 0.546*** 
 





Age of Firm 0.021*** -0.001 
 





Seasonal Activity -0.118*** -0.079* 
 





Single Plant -0.040 -0.186*** 
 





Access to Credit 0.063*** 0.011 
 





Manager 0.044*** 0.038** 
 





Woman -0.014 0.052** 
 





Age 0.008*** 0.004 
 
















Primary Education 0.057*** 0.023 
 





Secondary Education 0.125*** 0.177*** 
 
















Technical Training 0.063*** 0.085*** 
 










Industry Fixed Effects 
Included? 
Yes Yes 




Region Fixed Effects 
Included? 
Yes Yes 
       Observations 4,866 4,848 
 
Observations 4,995 4,990 
Source: Author's calculations based on MSE Surveys 
[Economic Research Forum].  
 
Source: Author's calculations based on MSE Surveys 
[Economic Research Forum].  
The table reports  the marginal effect on the firm's propensity 
to be formal from probit regressions that consider two 
different possible definitions of formality. Robust andard 
errors  are in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 
5%, *** significant at 1%. All variables are defined in Table 
A1. Single Worker and No Education are the omitted size and 
entrepreneur's education groups, respectively. Age of Firm 
squared and Age squared are also included in the regr ssions 
[not reported]. Industry fixed effects refer to the 2-digit 
industry or service. 
 
The table reports  the marginal effect on the firm's propensity 
to be formal from probit regressions that consider two 
different possible definitions of formality. Robust andard 
errors  are in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 
5%, *** significant at 1%. All variables are defined in Table 
A1. Single Worker and No Education are the omitted size and 
entrepreneur's education groups, respectively. Age of Firm 
squared and Age squared are also included in the regr ssions 
[not reported]. Industry fixed effects refer to the 2-digit 















Table A4. Switchers Analysis in Egypt         













Too expensive 15 0 1 0 16 
Tedious 9 5 1 0 15 
Useless 24 3 7 0 34 
Other 13 0 3 1 17 
Total 61 8 12 1 82 
Source: Author's calculations based on MSE Surveys (Economic Research Forum).  
The table reports the reasons pointed out by Egyptian firms for their behavior. We consider as switcher firms the ones that had began 
their operations without registering themselves and that decided to register afterwards. 
Table A5. Switchers Analysis in Morocco         













Too expensive 14 1 3 1 42 
Tedious 26 6 0 5 47 
Useless 30 6 0 7 95 
Other 20 2 0 7 61 
Total 90 15 3 20 245 
Source: Author's calculations based on MSE Surveys (Economic Research Forum).  
The table reports the reasons pointed out by Moroccan firms for their behavior. We consider as switcher firms the ones that had began 
their operations without registering themselves and that decided to register afterwards. 
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Obs. Mean Obs. Mean   
Obs. Mean Obs. Mean 
Firm Characteristics 
     
Firm Characteristics 
    
Number of Workers 106 1.89 1,259 1.72  Number of Workers 442 3.11 2,654 2.07 
Age of Firm 106 18 1,246 7  Age of Firm 442 17 2,652 9 
Exporter 106 0 1,255 0  Exporter 440 0.002 2,642 0.002 
Seasonal Activity 106 0.04 1,257 0.04  Seasonal Activity 442 0.05 2,647 0.03 
Single Plant 106 0.95 1,257 0.98  Single Plant 442 0.98 2,654 0.99 
Access to Credit 106 0.05 1,259 0.04  Access to Credit 440 0.27 2,638 0.14 
Entrepreneur Characteristics 
     
Entrepreneur Characteristics 
    
Woman 106 0.03 1,259 0.15  Woman 442 0.08 2,654 0.20 
Age 106 43 1,258 40  Age 442 42 2,654 37 
Education Level 
     
Education Level 
    
No Education 106 0.30 1,258 0.33  No Education 439 0.23 2,585 0.28 
Primary Education 106 0.21 1,258 0.19  Primary Education 439 0.33 2,585 0.34 
Secondary Education 106 0.33 1,258 0.37  Secondary Education 439 0.37 2,585 0.33 
Post-secondary Education 106 0.16 1,258 0.11  Post-secondary Education 439 0.07 2,585 0.05 
Technical Training 106 0.20 1,259 0.27  Technical Training 442 0.74 2.654 0.65 
Source: Author's calculations based onMSE Surveys (Economic Research 
Forum).  
Source: Author's calculations based onMSE Surveys (Economic Research 
Forum).  
